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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH ) 
) REPLY BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) OF APPELLANT 
vs. ) Priority No. 2 
EFRAIN M. VILLARREAL, ) Case No. 920730-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
INTRODUCTION 
The Briefs of Appellant and Appellee have been filed in, 
or transferred to, this Court. Pursuant to Rules 24 and 26 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant files this Reply Brief 
in response to the Appellee's Brief, which raises new issues. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The facts in the instant case have been previously 
addressed by the parties in their respective opening briefs. The 
facts are also presented at the beginning of each Point in the 
Argument section of this Brief. 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The statutes and constitutional provisions relevant to 
determining this case have been reproduced in Appendix 1 of Brief 
of Appellant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STANDARD FOR RESOLVING INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL CLAIMS IS WHETHER COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE FALLS 
BELOW AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS, AND NOT 
WHETHER COUNSEL GROSSLY DEVIATED FROM PROPER TRIAL COURT 
PRACTICE. 
The State has propounded what it believes is a new 
standard for what constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel in 
cases where the issue is "presented solely on the record of an 
appealed-from conviction." It argues that f![t]he 'deficient 
performance' element of an ineffective counsel claim should require 
defendant to show a gross deviation, clear on the record, from 
proper trial court practice." Appellee's Br. 20. 
This Court, as well as the overwhelming number of 
appellate courts, has never required an ineffective of counsel 
claimant to demonstrate that counsel grossly deviated from normal 
trial court practice. The rule has been, and should continue to 
be: 
To successfully assert an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, a defendant must show that 
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(i) counsel's performance was deficient in some 
demonstrable manner so as to fall below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and 
(ii) there is a reasonable probability that but for 
the ineffective assistance, the result in the proceeding 
would have been more favorable to the defendant. 
State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 555 (Utah Ct- App. 1991); see also 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-696, 104 S. Ct. 2052 
(1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State v. 
Montes, 804 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The State's novel 
theory, which, in essence, heightens the threshold requirement for 
claimants raising ineffective assistance for the first time on 
appeal, should summarily be rejected.1 
1
 In addition, to the extent that the State insinuates that 
Villarreal's appellate counsel was somehow negligent for not 
seeking a trial court remand on the ineffectiveness claim under 
Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, see Appellee's Br. 20 
n.7, counsel moves to strike that portion of the State's brief. 
Rule 23B became effective October 1, 1992, the date on which 
Villarreal's Supplemental Opening Brief was filed in the Supreme 
Court. See In re Proposed Amendments to Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, No. 920253 (S.Ct. August 10, 1992). Apart from the fact 
that Rule 23 was not in effect when Villarreal filed his briefs, 
the evidence pertinent to disposing this case are so clear on the 
record, such that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary. 
Counsel takes this opportunity to admonish the Attorney 
General's Office to litigate its cases, particularly criminal 
cases, in such a way that the State taxpayers do not incur 
unnecessary expenses. The instant case presents a perfect example 
of how the Attorney General's Office, Criminal Division, could 
enmesh fiscal conservatism into its litigation strategy. Here, the 
trial record is adequately developed for disposing of Villarreal's 
ineffectiveness claim. Yet, the State would prefer another hearing 
in the court below, which hearing, counsel submits, would only 
produce a record similar to that currently before this Court. 
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POINT II 
VILLARREAL HAS COHERENTLY DEMONSTRATED THAT HE WAS 
PREJUDICED BY COUNSEL'S DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE. 
On page 29 of its brief, the State claims that 
11
 [d]efendant does not coherently attempt to show that he was 
prejudiced by counsel's alleged jury selection miscues. Instead, 
he urges this Court to presume prejudice. . . . " It is true that, 
relying on Presley v. State, 750 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. App.), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 975 (1988), Villarreal urges a presumption of 
prejudice, on the ground that no trial strategy allows counsel to 
sit two jurors who were inferentially biased because of their 
personal or familial experience as victims of sexual assault -- the 
same crime for which Villarreal was tried.2 That argument, 
however, was an alternate to Villarreal's other argument that, 
under the standard enunciated by this Court in Woolley, he was 
(footnote 1, cont'd) 
Further, in several places in its brief, the State urges this 
Court to not address some of the issues raised by Villarreal 
because they were not preserved for appeal or because the trial 
court did not rule on them. See, e.g. , Appellee's Br. 19, 45. 
That those issue were not properly ruled upon and/or preserved for 
appeal is the essence of Villarreal's claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective. 
2
 See State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991); Appellee's Br. 28. 
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clearly prejudiced by counsel's failure to challenge five jurors 
for cause in this case where the evidence against him was not 
overwhelming. See Appellant's Opening Br. 21; Appellant's Supp. 
Br. 14, 19. 
POINT III 
REFERENCES TO ALLEGATIONS IN DISMISSED COUNTS WERE OVERLY 
PREJUDICIAL AND COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THEM 
RENDERED HIS PERFORMANCE DEFICIENT. 
The State concedes that references at Villarreal's trial 
to evidence of anal sodomy and rape, which counts had been 
dismissed at preliminary hearing, were improper under Rules 402, 
403, and 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Appellee's Br. 36-
37. The State goes on, however, to defend trial counsel, claiming 
that counsel's performance in not objecting to the admission of the 
evidence was "professionally []acceptable," because counsel made a 
strategic choice that "the references were not overly problematic." 
Appellee's Br. 37. 
The State's inability to recognize the problem associated 
with the admission of such damaging evidence, see Appellee's Br. 
37, also explains its inability to comprehend why " [defendant's 
explanation of the significance of preliminary hearing," Appellee's 
Br. 36, is germane to the question whether counsel's performance 
was constitutionally acceptable. First, a constitutionally 
acceptable defense counsel does not sit by and allow dismissed 
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allegations to be introduced against his or client. Cf. State v. 
Walters, 813 P.2d 857, 867 (Idaho 1990) (counsel's failure to 
object to prejudicial expert testimony was not objectively 
reasonable). Second, that those damaging allegations were allowed 
to resurface at trial without counsel's objection is the basis for 
Villarreal's claim that his preliminary hearing right as well as 
his right to a surprise-free trial were inadequately safeguarded, 
since he was not on notice that the State would attempt to 
prejudice the jury with those allegations. See, e.g., State v. 
Ortega, 751 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Utah 1988) (defendant could not be 
convicted of allegations that had been dismissed at preliminary 
hearing). Counsel's inadvertance in allowing clearly prejudicial 
evidence to be introduced by the State can hardly be seen as the 
making of a strategic choice. If it is harmful, any competent 
trial counsel would object to its introduction, especially before 
a jury. 
POINT IV 
ADMISSION OF BLAKE BEDIENT'S CONFESSION AGAINST 
VILLARREAL VIOLATED VILLARREAL'S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION. 
A. Confrontation Clause Violation; 
The State argues that the admission of the confession of 
Blake Bedient, Villarreal's alleged accomplice, was proper under 
the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment and Rule 804(b)(3), 
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Utah Rules of Evidence. As the argument goes, since he had been 
separately tried and convicted, 
Bedient was no more than an ordinary witness of the 
events in question [at Villarreal's trial]. Therefore, 
the confrontation clause problems inhering in the use of 
a co-defendant's confession at a joint trial, see Lee v. 
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 542 (1986), and Bruton v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 123, 136-37 (1968), were not presented 
by Bedient's testimony. See United States v. Smith, 432 
F.2d 1109, 1111 (7th Cir. 1970), and Faulkner v. State, 
646 P.2d 1304, 1306 (Okla. 1982). . . . 
Appellee's Br. 53. 
Villarreal understands the State's argument to be thus: 
that a confrontation clause issue could only surface at a joint 
trial of codefendants or accomplices. Such a conclusion on the 
part of the State is clearly erroneous and misleading. A 
confrontation clause problem could arise, and has arisen, at 
separate trials of accomplices. And the courts have found 
inadmissible, because of confrontation clause problems, one 
accomplice's confession against another. See, e.g., State v. 
Watts, 452 N.W.2d 728 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Standifur, 
526 A.2d 955 (Md. 1987). 
Thus, because he was an accomplice, Bedient clearly was 
more than "an ordinary witness" during Villarreal's trial. He was 
an accomplice whose hearsay confession was admitted against a 
criminal defendant, in violation of the confrontation clause. 
Villarreal certainly had no way to meaningfully cross-examine 
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Bedient who, as the State acknowledged, "mostly persisted in his 
refusal to answer [questions]." Appellee's Br. 54. It is 
axiomatic that a declarant who refuses to testify is unavailable 
for confrontation clause purposes. See United States v. Barlow, 
693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983). As 
such, analysis of Bedient's confession should have begun "with the 
presumption that such confessions are not firmly rooted and are 
inadmissible against the defendant except upon a particularized 
guarantee of reliability." Comment, Of Confrontation: The Right 
Not To Be Convicted On the Hearsay Declarations of An Accomplice, 
1990 Utah L. Rev. 855, 878 ("Comment"). No such finding of 
particularized guarantee of trustworthiness was accomplished in 
this case. See Standifur, 526 A.2d at 955 (analyzing factors to be 
considered in determining reliability of an accomplice's 
confession). Therefore, the admission of Bedient's confession 
violated Villarreal's right of confrontation. See id. 
B. Admission of the Confession under Rule 804(bW3) is 
Unconstitutional: 
The State also defends the trial court's admission of 
Bedient's confession against Villarreal under Rule 804(b)(3), which 
is the statement against penal interest hearsay exception. See 
Utah R. Evid. 804(b)(3). It argues that Rule 804(b)(3) represents 
such a "firmly-rooted hearsay exception," such that the proponent 
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of the evidence need not demonstrate the statement's -- here -- the 
confession's, reliability. Appellee's Br. 55. 
After an in-depth study of Rule 804(b)(3)/ one 
commentator has noted that "[t]he [Supreme] Court has never 
considered declarations against penal interest as a 'firmly-rooted" 
hearsay exception[,]" and that Rule 804(b)(3) is plagued with 
numerous constitutional deficiencies. See Comment/ at 877; see 
also Olsen v. Green, 688 F.2d 421/ 427 n.ll (8th Cir.) (statements 
against penal interest "do not constitute a well-recognized 
exception to the hearsay rules"), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 1009 
(1982); Note, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the 
Confrontation Clause, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 159/ 162 (1983) (statements 
against penal interest "were not well received at common law in 
either English or American courts"). Indeed/ the Supreme Court 
rejected the prosecution's characterization of the hearsay involved 
in Lee "as a simple 'declaration against penal interest.' That 
concept defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation 
Clause analysis. We decide this case as involving a confession by 
an accomplice which incriminates a criminal defendant." Lee v. 
Illinois, 476 U.S. 530/ 544 n.5 (1986) (emphasis added). 
Again, the State's conclusion that the confrontation 
clause and/or Lee allows the admission of Bedient's confession 
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against Villarreal under Rule 804(b)(3) is erroneous.3 First, it 
is unclear whether Bedient's statement to the police was in fact a 
non-collateral, against-interest confession under Rule 804. The 
confession was made in police custody, under circumstances in which 
Bedient had a motive to curry favor. See Standifur, 526 A.2d at 
959-60 (confessions which implicate declarant and third party, 
particularly when made in police custody, are generally 
inadmissible because not actually against declarant's penal 
interest). Second, the confession was not sufficiently 
corroborated by circumstances surrounding its making. See id. ; see 
also Comment, at 896 (confession not corroborated by totality of 
surrounding circumstances is inadmissible). 
In short, the State did not even meet the threshold 
requirement for admitting an unavailable declarant's confession 
under Rule 804(b)(3). Even if the State met that standard, the 
admission in this case of Bedient's confession under Rule 804(b)(3) 
violated Villarreal's confrontation rights. See Watts. 452 N.W.2d 
at 731 (declaration against interest may comport with evidentiary 
rule and yet violate the confrontation clause). 
3
 To the extent that State v. Drawn, 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990), found no confrontation clause problems in admitting 
an accomplice's confession against a criminal defendant under Rule 
804(b)(3), Villarreal urges this Court to overrule it as 
inconsistent with Lee. See also Comment, at 892-94 (arguing that 
Drawn was incorrectly decided and urging that it be overruled). 
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POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT COULD NOT HAVE CONSTITUTIONALLY 
ADMITTED BEDIENT'S CONFESSION UNDER RULE 801(d)(1)(A), 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
To minimize the prejudice to Villarreal, the State argues 
that the district court adequately protected him by reducing the 
impact of Bedient's confession: 
Because Bedient denied that he had inculpated the 
defendant when he confessed to Hodgkinson, the trial 
court could have admitted the detective's report to the 
contrary as Bedient's non-hearsay prior inconsistent 
statement, under Rule 801(d)(1)(A), Utah Rules of 
Evidence. By excluding that portion of the Bedient's 
confession that directly inculpated defendant, the 
prosecution was denied powerful substantive evidence. 
Appellee's Br. 56. 
The state is entirely mistaken in assuming that Bedient's 
confession was admissible as a Rule 801(d)(1)(A) prior inconsistent 
statement. Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(1)(A), like its 
counterpart in 804(b)(3), does not give adequate consideration to 
the confrontation clause. The Advisory Committee note to Rule 
801(d)(1)(A) recognizes the confrontation clause problem inherent 
in the rule under California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).4 See 
4
 In Green, the Supreme Court permitted the admission at trial 
of a prior inconsistent statement of a preliminary hearing witness 
against a criminal defendant. The Court found the testimony 
constitutionally admissible because the witness had testified under 
oath and was subject to cross-examination at the preliminary 
hearing. See Green, 399 U.S. at 165. Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A), 
on the other hand, allows for the admission of extrajudicial 
statements not made under oath as prior inconsistent statement. 
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Advisory Committee Note to Rule 801, reprinted in Utah Court Rules 
Annotated p. 584 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1992). 
Cognizant of the Court's decision in Green# the drafters 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence "allows only those [prior 
inconsistent statements] made while the declarant was subject to 
cross-examination at a trial or hearing or in a deposition, to be 
admissible for their truth1' under Rule 801(d)(1)(A).5 See Notes 
of the Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No. 93-650, 
reprinted in Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 801.11, p. 722 
(2d ed. 1986) ("Graham"); see also Notes of the Conference 
Committee, House Report, No. 93-1597, reprinted in Graham, at 723-
24. See, e.g., United States v. Day, 789 F.2d 1217, 1222 (6th Cir. 
1986) ("Several circuits have already incorporated the 
congressional intent into decisions that have refused to admit 
statements given under informal circumstances tantamount to a 
station house interrogation setting which later prove inconsistent 
5
 Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 801(d)(1)(A), provides: 
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not 
hearsay if --
(1) Prior Statements by Witness. The declarant 
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-
examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) 
inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath 
subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or 
other proceeding, or in a deposition, . . . 
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with a declarant's trial testimony and have denied their 
admissibility as substantive evidence pursuant to 801(d)(1)(A). 
• • • i • 
Utah's Rule 801(d)(1)(A), on the other hand, deviates 
from the federal rule and provides for the admission of prior 
inconsistent statement even if, as here, the declarant did not make 
the extrajudicial statement under oath, subject to cross-
examination. Compare Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) with Fed. R. Evid. 
801(d)(1)(A). The problems associated with Utah's approach is 
succinctly described by Professor Graham as follows: 
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) as promulgated by the Advisory 
Committee and prescribed by the Supreme Court, required 
only that the declarant be present at trial, give 
testimony, and be subject to cross-examination as to the 
prior inconsistent statement. Under Proposed Rule 
801(d)(1)(A), oral and written statements not made at 
formal proceedings would have been included. Thus prior 
inconsistent statements outside the scope of Rule 
801(d)(1)(A) but within the proposed rule include oral 
and written statements of witnesses made to investigators 
for insurance companies and police officers. The 
reliability of such statements is suspect, i.e., they are 
often biased as a result of subtle influence, coercion or 
deceit on the part of the person eliciting the statement. 
See, e.g., Statement by Herbert Semmell, Hearings on H.R. 
5464 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 
2d Sess. 302 (1974) : 
The problems of inaccurate repetition, 
ambiguity and incompleteness of out-of-court 
statements may be found in both written and 
oral statements, although the problem is more 
acute in oral statements. But written 
statements are also subject to distortion. We 
are all familiar with the way a skilled 
investigator, be he a lawyer, police officer, 
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insurance claim agent, or private detective, 
can listen to a potential witness and then 
prepare a statement for signature by the 
witness which reflects the interest of the 
investigator's client or agency. Adverse 
details are omitted; subtle changes of 
emphasis are made. It is regrettable but true 
that some lawyers will distort the truth to 
win a case and that some police officers will 
do the same to "solve" a crime, particularly 
one which has aroused the public interest or 
caused public controversy. Or the police 
officer may be seeking to put away a 
"dangerous criminal" who the officer "knows" 
is guilty but against whom evidence is 
lacking. 
See also Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753, 762 n. 13 
(8th Cir. 1967) : 
Today the art of statement taking is a 
recognized science. Inbau & Reid, Criminal 
Interrogation & Confessions (1962); Schwartz, 
Trial of Automobile Accident Cases, Vol. I, § 
4, pp. 5, 6, "Requisites of Witnesses 
Statements," 3rd ed. (1965); Smithson, 
Insurance Law Journal, June, 1958, "Liability 
Claims and Litigation," pp. 375-403; 
Schweitzer, Cyclopedia of Trial Practice, Vol. 
I, § 30, p. 58, "Securing Statements from 
Witnesses" (1954); Donaldson Casualty Claims 
Practice, "Richard D. Erwin Series in Risk & 
Insurance" (1964), pp. 481-500; Averback, 
Handling Accident Cases, Vol. 2, p. 269 
(1958). Whether the problem be one of fault 
in communication to a good faith interrogator 
or culpable strategy of the examiner, is 
immaterial. The fact remains, most ex parte 
statements reflect the subjective interest and 
attitude of the examiner as well. 
With respect to statements not made at formal 
proceedings, the danger also exists that the asserted 
existence of the prior statement may be a fabrication. 
Implicitly rejected in this argument is the view that 
examination of either the declarant when he testifies in 
- 14 -
court or the witness presenting extrinsic proof of the 
prior inconsistent statement will successfully expose a 
fabrication or bring to light any illegitimate influence 
that acted to color the declarant's prior statement. For 
further discussion of Rule 801(d)(1)(A), see Graham, 
Employing Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment and as 
Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed 
Amendments of Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 613 
and 607, 75 Mich.L.Rev. 1565 (1977). 
Graham, p. 732 n.13. 
As such, as it currently stands, Rule 801(d)(1)(A), Utah 
R. Evid., does not pass muster under the confrontation clause of 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 
1, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution. Consequently, contrary to 
the State's assertion, the district court could not have 
constitutionally admitted Bedient's hearsay against Villarreal 
under Rule 801(d)(1)(A). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Independently or cumulatively, counsel's failure to 
competently represent Villarreal's interest as discussed above 
require a reversal. Further, the trial court erroneously admitted 
several damaging evidence against Villarreal. This Court should 
reverse Villarreal's conviction and remand this case for a new 
trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of December, 1992. 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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